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Abstract
We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA)
for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game
with asymmetric player demands, we find a Lyapunov function governing the “better-response” Jacobi
dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points
do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does.
There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which both interior Nash equilibrium points are
locally asymptotically stable. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering
power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions. Also, for a power control game
with a single Nash equilibrium, we show how its stability changes as a function of the altruism parameter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic models for telecommunication systems have recently been surveyed in [4].
They are motivated by the need to model the very significant effects of end-user behavior. In
the Internet, TCP congestion control, a protocol presuming cooperative end-user behavior, has
been exploited by end-users and their client applications acting in selfish ways. As common in
some wireless settings, e.g., tactical mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network nodes may
The work was supported by NSF CISE grants 0524202 and 0915928 and by a Cisco Systems URP gift.
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2engage in cooperative/coalitional or simply altruistic behavior with respect to some of their
peers. Altruistic action can be for the purpose of routing [7], medium access, etc. In [10], the
behavior of permanent seeder peers in on-line BitTorrent swarms (characterized as altruistic) is
asymmetric; clearly if one peer is completely selfish and the other completely altruistic, then
the greedy peer stands to benefit. We consider a symmetric situation where the players have
similar communication priorities and degrees of altruism. This said, the demands of the players
are, however, generally assumed asymmetric in the following.
In distributed systems, altruistic actions can easily be shown to be counter-productive in the
presence of
• limited information and/or observation errors,
• excessive communication overhead to (securely) convey more accurate network state infor-
mation, and/or
• deliberate injection of false observation information by enemy actors.
In these cases, selfish behavior alone will give better performance. In coalitional games, the
cost of cooperation is typically weighed against its benefits, e.g., [5]. Extensive prior work has
considered the effects of imperfect learning of the utilities of other players and the parameters
of the environment in which they all interact, e.g., [11], [26], [25].
In this paper, we assume perfectly correct and complete information about the player who is
the target of altruistic behavior, and this at no cost. Despite this assumption, we show that it is
possible that negative performance effects are possible under altruistic behavior. In particular,
we will consider iterative games where utilities are a function of average throughput. The games
are “quasi stationary” in that the (mixed or pure) strategies of players were based on observed
players’ actions over time [23].
That Nash equilibria of iterative games are not necessarily asymptotically stable is well known,
e.g., [22], [1], [27]. In slotted-ALOHA medium access under congestion, each user (player) i
attempts to transmit with probability pi (i.e., his/her control variable or strategy), so that the
probability of successful transmission is γi = pi
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj). In [12], [13], using a Lyapunov
function for arbitrary N ≥ 2 players, noncooperative two-player ALOHA was shown to have
two different interior1 Nash equilibria though only one was locally asymptotically stable, see
1i.e., not including the stable boundary deadlock equilibrium.
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3also [15]. These local stability properties will change in the presence of altruistic behavior
studied herein. In some partially altruistic cases, both interior Nash equilibria will be locally
asymptotically stable. Local asymptotic stability properties are generally important for robust
performance in the presence of modeling, estimation and quantization errors, e.g., [6]. We
similarly explore simple distributed power control medium access dynamics having a single
feasible equilibrium.
We focus on two-player games because: (a) the communication overhead required to accurately
inform altruistic behavior will not scale to many users, (b) the players are assumed to have
different utilities so one of them could be a model for an aggregation of users, and (c) the
purely altruistic dynamics have a vector field (and Lyapunov function) expressible in closed
form.
We also assume synchronous player action; the effects of asynchronous player action can be
considered using, e.g., the methods of [9], [8]. Even in these more general scenarios, poten-
tially unstable Nash equilibria for synchronous two-person sub-game would remain a significant
challenge for altruistic behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give an overview of our game-theoretic
framework. In Section III, we give the main results on the stability properties of the Nash
equilibria, as a function of the “degree of altruism”, of a two-player, synchronously iterative
ALOHA medium access game. In Section IV, we consider variations of our game framework in
which the utility is linear (instead of strictly concave) and costs are based on energy expenditure
(rather than throughput). In Section V, we study medium access by power control involving a
single feasible Nash equilibrium point. Finally, we conclude with a brief summary.
II. ALTRUISTIC GAMES
By using his/her control action (strategy) qi, the ith player seeks to maximize the composite
of the net utilities Vj(γj) := Uj(γj)− γjM , i.e.,∑
j
αij(Uj(γj)− γjM), (1)
where i and j index the players,∑
k
αik = 1 and αij ≥ 0 ∀i, j, (2)
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4γM is the usage-based charge for service γ, and all utilities Ui are strictly concave, i.e.,
U ′′i (γi) < 0 ∀γi ∈ R+. (3)
The player actions q are related to the service γ through the network’s dynamics. For the example
of slotted ALOHA used below,
γi = qi
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj),
where the (re)transmission probabilities 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1 for all i. So, the users need to be aware of
each others’ actions and utilities2. For all collective-action vectors q, we will typically assume
∂γi
∂qi
(q) > 0 ∀q, i, and ∂γi
∂qj
(q) < 0 ∀q, i 6= j. (4)
A. Purely selfish/non-cooperative games
Regarding player i’s net utility,
∂Vi
∂qi
(q) = (U ′i(γi(q))−M)
∂γi
∂qi
(q),
where we have now explicitly written the γi as functions of q. So, at a Nash equilibrium point
(NEP) qˆ of a non-altruistic game, i.e., where αii = 1 for all i,
γi(qˆ) = (U
′
i)
−1(M) =: yi ∀i. (5)
Note that by the concavity assumption of the Ui, at a NEP qˆ is
∂2Vi
∂q2i
(qˆ) = U ′′i (γi(qˆ))
(
∂γi
∂qi
(qˆ)
)2
< 0.
That is, (5) and (3) are the conditions for q to be an NEP.
2In the purely selfish/non-cooperative games (αii = 1 ∀i) of [14], actions were taken based on observations in quasi steady-
state thus not requiring any coordination between presumed selfish/non-cooperative peers.
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5B. Altruistic invariance of NEPs
Claim 1: Under (3), the NEPs of the purely selfish game (αii = 1 for all i) are also NEPs
under the altruistic objective (1) for all [αij] satisfying (2).
Proof: Note that for objectives (1), the first order condition for player i is∑
j
αij(U
′
j(γj(q))−M)
∂γj
∂qi
(q) = 0.
So, clearly this condition is satisfied when q = qˆ, i.e., under (5). Moreover, the second order
condition at such a qˆ (again, under (5)) reduces to
∑
j
αijU
′′
j (γj(qˆ))
(
∂γj
∂qj
(qˆ)
)2
< 0.
When the γj are all linear functions of q, a qualified converse of the previous claim, i.e., that
there are no additional interior NEPs under altruistic behavior, is given in [18].
C. Asymptotic stability of NEPs under symmetric altruism
Again, it is possible that NEPs are not asymptotically stable. Though the positions of the
NEPs may not change under altruistic behavior, the nature of their stability may change with
the (αij) parameters (as in the bifurcation theory of dynamical systems). Exploring this issue
for specific examples is the main goal of the balance of this paper.
In the following, we restrict our attention to “symmetric” altruism where for some fixed
α ∈ [0, 1], αii = α and αij = (1−α)/(N −1) for all N ≥ 2 players i, and all j 6= i. Symmetric
altruism is consistent with players whose communication is of equal priority, though they may
value their own communication differently through different utility functions.
III. TWO-PLAYER ALOHA GAME WITH SYMMETRIC ALTRUISM
In the following, we simplify to the symmetric case by assuming the αii are the same (α) for
all players i. For the selfish, non-cooperative ALOHA game (i.e., α = 1), the (re)transmission
probabilities qi obey the following continuous-time Jacobi approximation (e.g., (10) of [13]):
q˙(t) = F (q(t))− q(t), (6)
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6where for players i ∈ {1, 2}:
Fi(q) =
yi
1− q3−i .
The deadlock equilibrium qi = 1 ∀i is stable in the purely noncooperative case, and opt-out
equilibrium qi = 0 ∀i is stable in the purely altruistic case; at either equilibrium point, all
players have zero throughput. To address this problem, we can restrict qi ∈ [qmin, qmax] for all i,
so that
Fi(q) = min{qmax,max{qmin, yi
1− q3−i}},
where large qmax < 1 is set to prevent a deadlock (or “capture” by just one player) and small
qmin > 0 is set to prevent opt-out. Our focus in this section will be on the stability of interior
Nash equilibria for concave utilities.
In a distributed system, the Jacobi approximation is further justified when players take small
steps toward their currently optimal play (i.e., only “better response” based on their current
knowledge of the state of the game including the actions of the other players in particular,
i.e., fictitious play [23]). One reason for this is that players act simultaneously so the optimal
plays may change significantly. Thus, small steps may avoid large oscillations in the network
dynamics, i.e., oscillations that will be harmful to performance (e.g., the balance between tentative
and aggressive action taken by TCP in its distributed congestion control strategy). Also, small
steps may ensure convergence to stable interior equilibria, even under asynchronous updates,
and avoid deadlock or opt-out boundary equilibria.
A Lyapunov function governing the Jacobi iteration (6) is a function Λ such that for all times
t, the inner product 〈∇Λ(q(t)), q˙(t)〉 ≤ 0. For the non-cooperative N-player game [12], [13],
Λ(q) = −
N∏
i=1
yi
1− qi +
N∑
i=1
(
qi
1− qi + log(1− qi)
)∏
j 6=i
yj.
In the following, we will assume N = 2 players.
A. Purely altruistic game (α = 0)
The throughput of player 3− i is (1− qi)q3−i, so that the purely altruistic choice for player i
is qi = 1− y3−i/q3−i. Thus, player i ∈ {1, 2} updates
qi = 1− y3−i
q3−i
=: Gi(q). (7)
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7That is, replace F with G in (6).
By Claim 1, the fixed points for this purely altruistic game (α = 0) include those of the purely
selfish game (α = 1), i.e., both given by the solution of yi = qi(1− q3−i) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Claim 2: The Lyapunov function of the purely altruistic game is
Λ∗(q) = −
2∏
i=1
(1− yi
qi
) +
2∑
i=1
yi log qi. (8)
Proof:
dΛ∗
dt
(q) = 〈∇Λ∗(q), q˙〉 = −
2∑
i=1
(Gi − qi)2 yi
q2i
≤ 0.
B. Stability of purely altruistic or purely cooperative behavior
Let H∗, respectively H , be the Hessian corresponding to Λ∗, respectively Λ, i.e., H∗ij =
∂2Λ∗/∂qi∂qj for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Claim 3: (a) The NEP q is locally stable under purely altruistic (α = 0) behavior
⇔ σ∗ := y1y2
q21q
2
2
< 1. (9)
(b) The NEP q is locally stable under purely selfish (α = 1) behavior
⇔ σ := y1y2
(1− q1)2(1− q2)2 < 1. (10)
Proof: H∗ is positive definite (i.e., with two positive, real eigenvalues) at the NEP q
(i.e., where G(q) = q) if and only if (9). Similarly, H is positive definite at the NEP q (i.e., where
F (q) = q) if and only if (10).
The example selfish two-player ALOHA game of [12], [13] with (y1, y2) = (8/15, 1/15) had
NEPs (q1, q2) = (2/3, 1/5) and (4/5, 1/3):
NEP q σ σ∗
(2/3, 1/5) 1/2 2
(4/5, 1/3) 2 1/2
So, for purely altruistic (cooperative α = 0) actions, (4/5,1/3) is the locally asymptotically
stable NEP but (2/3,1/5) is unstable. On the other hand, for purely selfish (non-cooperative
α = 1) actions, (2/3,1/5) is the locally stable NEP but (4/5,1/3) is unstable. Clearly, σ < 1 and
σ∗ < 1 is not possible if q1 + q2 < 1, but note that q1 + q2 > 1 for the NEP (4/5, 1/3).
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8C. Numerical example for partial altruism
Given the current play q3−i of player 3 − i, let Qi(α, q3−i) be the play of the ith player that
maximizes (1), i.e., Q is used instead of F in (6). In particular,
Qi(α, q3−i) =

 Fi if α = 1Gi if α = 0
with no such closed-form expression available for Qi when 0 < α < 1.
For utilities of the form
Ui(γ) = M(1 + y
2
i ) arctan(γ), (11)
we numerically evaluated the local asymptotic stability of the two NEPs. That is, we chose
utilities normalized by the price M so that we can simply take M = 1. Stability can be
ascertained by the Hartman-Grobman theorem (linearizing the dynamics at the equilibrium point
and checking the eigenvalues of the Jacobian), i.e., even if a Lyapunov function is not available.
Note from the following table that the stability of the NEP (4/5,1/3) changes at α ≈ 0.58 and
similarly the stability of the NEP (2/3,1/5) changes at α ≈ 0.42.
NEP\α ∈ [0, 0.42) [0.42, 0.58] (0.58, 1]
(2/3, 1/5) unstable stable stable
(4/5, 1/3) stable stable unstable
So, in the range 0.42 ≤ α ≤ 0.58 both interior NEPs are locally asymptotically stable. The
contours of the Lyapunov function Λ are given in Figure 1(a) and of Λ∗ in Figure 1(c), where
one clearly sees the saddle contour in the latter. Given the large interval about α = 0.5 where
both NEP are stable, by continuity we expect that the this condition will hold for all sufficiently
small asymmetries in altruism between the players, i.e., α11 6= α22.
D. Discussion: Alternative altruistic strategies
We now give a Lyapunov function as a function of α for an alternative altruistic play, i.e., one
that does not necessarily maximize (1).
Generally, Qi(α, q3−i) will be a non-linear function of α. We can consider an alternative play
that is a linear combination:
Qoi := αFi + (1− α)Gi.
October 3, 2018 DRAFT
90.658 0.66 0.662 0.664 0.666 0.668 0.67 0.672 0.674 0.676
0.19
0.192
0.194
0.196
0.198
0.2
0.202
0.204
0.206
0.208
0.21
(a) Stable α = 1
0.655 0.66 0.665 0.67 0.675 0.68
0.185
0.19
0.195
0.2
0.205
0.21
(b) Stable α = 0.5
0.658 0.66 0.662 0.664 0.666 0.668 0.67 0.672 0.674 0.676
0.19
0.192
0.194
0.196
0.198
0.2
0.202
0.204
0.206
0.208
0.21
(c) Unstable (saddle) α = 0
Fig. 1. The ALOHA NEP (2/3,1/5)
Moreover, instead of the purely altruistic Gi, consider
G˜i =
(
1− y3−i
q3−i
)
y2i (q
−1
i − 1)2,
corresponding to the α-linear action
Q˜i = αFi + (1− α)G˜i.
At a fixed point q for a purely altruistic game using G˜i, qi can be easily shown to be an increasing
function of Giy2i .
Claim 4: The Jacobi iteration (6) using Q˜ instead of F has the following Lyapunov function:
Λα(q) = − α
2∏
i=1
yi
1− qi − (1− α)
2∏
i=1
hi(qi)
+
2∑
i=1
(
qi
1− qi + log(1− qi)
)
y3−i
October 3, 2018 DRAFT
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where hi(qi) := yi − y2i /qi.
Note: We have modified the Lyapunov function (7) of [12], [13] by adding the α factors and
the second term.
Proof:
dΛα
dt
(q) =< ∇Λα(q), q˙ >= −
2∑
i=1
(q˙i)
2 y3−i
(1− qi)2 ≤ 0.
We can similarly modify the purely altruistic iteration and find a Lyapunov function modified
from Λ∗. Note that for these dynamics, the positions of interior NEPs may change as a function
of α.
IV. DISCUSSION: VARIATIONS OF THE GAME FRAMEWORK
In this section we discuss other extensions and variations of the synchronous, two-player game
framework of the previous section.
A. Linear utilities
If Ui(γ) ≡ uiγ for a scalar ui > M , then the net utility of player i is simply γi(ui −M).
So, in the purely selfish (α = 1) case, player i will simply maximize γi. That is, the selfish
strategy is simply qi = 1 if qj < 1 ∀j 6= i. Thus, any play q such that at least one player i uses
the “pure” strategy qi = 1 is a NEP. These include the deadlocked NEPs where two or more
players choose q = 1 so that γ = 0 for all players.
In the purely altruistic, two-player case, each player i will simply maximize γ3−i = q3−i(1−qi)
(of the other player) over qi, i.e., choose qi = 0 if q3−i > 0. So, any play q such that at least
one player uses the pure (opt-out) strategy q = 0 is an NEP.
For partially altruistic behavior, (1) with 0 < α < 1 remains a linear form. For the two-player
game at equilibrium, qi = 1 if
α(1− q3−i)(ui −M)− (1− α)q3−i(u3−i −M) > 0
⇔ q3−i < α(ui −M)
α(ui −M) + (1− α)(u3−i −M) =: φ3−i(α).
So, there are two stable NEPs (0,1) and (1,0) and the unstable saddle NEP φ(α) between them.
More precisely, the following table indicates convergence trend based on the starting point q.
October 3, 2018 DRAFT
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staring q ∈ NEP q
[0, φ1(α))× (φ2(α), 1] (0,1)
(φ1(α), 1]× [0, φ2(α)) (1,0)
[0, φ1(α))× [0, φ2(α)) φ(α)
(φ1(α), 1]× (φ2(α), 1] φ(α)
Note that both (0,1) and (1,0) are NEPs for α = 0 and α = 1 as well.
B. Power based costs
Now instead of a cost of the form Mγ (i.e., what the network charges for actual throughput),
consider a cost of the form Mq (i.e., the average cost for power experienced by the user). Power-
based costs are important for the context communications relying on limited energy supply in
order to account for energy expenditure for failed communication due to interference (as here)
and/or noise.
Under power-based costs, the NEPs may change position as a function of the degree of
altruistic behavior, α, i.e., Claim 1 does not necessarily hold, cf., Section V-E.
1) Strictly concave utilities: Here, the purely selfish update rule is
F#i (q−i) =
1∏
j 6=i 1− qi
(U ′i)
−1
(
M∏
j 6=i 1− qi
)
. (12)
For scalar parameters βi, ui > 0, consider utilities of the form
Ui(γ) =
Mui
βi
arctan(βiγ) ⇒ (U ′i)−1(z) =
1
βi
√
Mui
z
− 1.
For two players, (12) becomes
F#i (q3−i) =
1
βi(1− q3−i)
√
ui(1− q3−i)− 1 ≈ yi√
1− q3−i ,
where here yi :=
√
ui/βi and the approximation holds when
ui(1− q3−i) ≫ 1. (13)
Under (13), the two-player Lyapunov function for purely selfish behavior is
Λ#(q) = −
∏
i
yi√
1− qi +
∑
i
(
√
1− qi + 1√
1− qi )
∏
j 6=i
yi.
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Under purely altruistic behavior, we see that
∂
∂qi
(U3−i(γ3−i)−Mq3−i) = −q3−iU ′3−i(γ3−i) ≤ 0.
Thus, the only NEPs q are such that qi = 0 for at least one player i, i.e., the opt-out action.
Suppose each utility Ui is strictly concave only for an interval [0, γˆi] and U ′i(γi(q)) = 0 when
γi(q) > γˆi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (14)
i.e., the utility “saturates” after γˆi < 1. Clearly here there will be additional NEPs under purely
altruistic behavior: the set of plays q which jointly satisfy (14), assuming this set has non-empty
intersection with the feasibility region [0, 1]2 for (q0, q1).
2) Linear utilities: Here again take Ui(γ) = uiγ for a scalar ui. For the partially altruistic
two-player case, qi = 1 if
α[(1− q3−i)ui −M ]− (1− α)q3−iu3−i) > 0
⇔ q3−i < α(ui −M)
αui + (1− α)u3−i) =: ψ
M
3−i(α).
The situation here is as in Section IV-A, except that for α = 1 there is an additional unstable
interior NEP, ψM(1).
For α > 0 and ui = uj =: u (identical players), we can derive a price Mˆ(α) for purely selfish
behavior that mirrors α-partially altruistic behavior:
ψM(α) = ψMˆ(α)(1) ⇒ Mˆ(α) = u− α(u−M).
V. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL GAMES
Game-theoretic models for power control have been extensively studied, e.g., [21], [20], [2],
[24], [16], including consideration of issues of robust convergence to equilibria, e.g., [3]. In the
following, we consider a game played by unidirectional flows between pairs of nodes, including
the mesh networking case where all one-hop flows share a single (gateway) node, but that node
does not act as a central authority (base station or, possibly, mesh access point), rather the system
is distributed in its decision making regarding transmission powers.
We further assume that a transmission attempt occurs in every time-slot by every player.
The signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR):
SINRi(q) :=
qihii
N +
∑
j 6=i hjiqj
,
October 3, 2018 DRAFT
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where N is the ambient noise power, the power qi ≥ 0 pertains to the transmitter of flow i, and
hji are the path gains between the transmitter of flow j and the receiver of flow i. Indeed, SINRi
is the SINR at the receiver of flow i. See Figure 2 illustrating two flow with transmitters Tk and
receivers Rk, k ∈ {0, 1}.
T0
R0
T1
R1
h00
h11
h01
h10
Fig. 2. Two interfering flows
The demands of each player i yi := (U ′i)−1(M), as above.
Note that bidirectional links are not considered above due to self-interference at the trans-
mitters/receivers. Typically, each way communication of a bidirectional link will be separated
by TDMA, FDMA or CDMA/spread-spectrum means. In the TDMA setting for a distributed
multihop wireless network, a spatial scheduling problem ensues, e.g., [19].
A. From SINR to QoS, γ
Shannon’s expression for capacity log(1+SINR) is often used to map SINR to service quality.
For different modulation frameworks, we can idealize
γi(q) := Γ(SINRi(q))
for correspondingly different increasing functions Γ, so that (4) holds [17]. If the number of bits
per frame n is large and pe an exponential function of SINR (as, e.g., under DBPSK or GFSK
modulation), then3
Γ(SINR) ≈ exp(−n exp(−SINR)).
We used this expression in our numerical studies below.
3cf., the Appendix.
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B. The selfish game
In a quasi-stationary selfish game, the users observe their interference and user i sets
qi = Υi(N +
∑
j 6=i
qjhji) =: F
o
i ,
where
Υi := Γ
−1(yi)/hii. (15)
Note that this system is simply affine in q and a unique NEP q such that q = F o(q) can be
determined if the matrix I−Ψ is nonsingular where Ψji := hjiΥi ∀j 6= i and Ψii := 0 ∀i (again,
here we are not considering constraints on power). That is, the NEP would be
qT = NΥT(I −Ψ)−1. (16)
For a two-player game, the Lyapunov function of the continuous-time Jacobi iteration q˙ =
F o(q)− q is the quadratic form
Λo(q) =
∑
i
hi,3−iΥ3−i(
1
2
q2i −NΥiqi)−
∏
i
qihi,3−iΥi.
The system is (globally) asymptotically stable with unique “interior” NEP if I − Ψ has all
eigenvalues with modulus < 1. Equivalently, we can specify stability in terms of the Hessians
of the quadratic Lyapunov function, Λo. The result is that the NEP is stable if∏
i
hi,3−iΥi < 1. (17)
C. The purely altruistic game
For an altruistic two-player game with information sharing as above, user i sets
qi =
1
h3−i,i
(
q3−i
Υ3−i
−N) =: Goi .
Note that Goi is also a simple affine function. Again, we can show that the NEP (16) holds here
too and similarly study its stability properties as in the non-cooperative case.
The Lyapunov function for the altruistic (q˙ = Go − q) two-player game is
Λ+(q) =
∑
i
1
hi,3−iΥi
(
N
h3−i,i
qi +
1
2
q2i )−
∏
i
qi
hi,3−iΥi
.
October 3, 2018 DRAFT
15
The NEP stability condition for altruistic dynamics is∏
i
hi,3−iΥi > 1, (18)
which obviously cannot be true if (17) holds.
Recalling (15), we see a potentially beneficial role for symmetric altruism in the case where∏
i Γ
−1(yi) >
∏
i hii/hi,3−i so that (17) does not hold, and therefore (18) does.
D. Numerical example
Consider an example where the frame sizes n = 1024 bits (128 bytes), the desired mean
correct frame transmission probabilities (y0, y1) = (.97, .98), the noise power N = 1.0 (so the
transmission powers (q1, q0) are normalized with respect to noise), the path gains4 hi,i = 0.1 and
hi,3−i = 0.005 for all i, and the utilities are of the arctan form (11).
The unique feasible NEP is (q0, q1) = (224, 230) with corresponding SINRs of 10.4 and 10.8,
respectively, and comparable noise and interference magnitudes. This NEP does not change
position as the altruism parameter α changes, i.e., Claim 1. The asymptotic stability condition
for altruistic dynamics (18) does not hold for this example, giving a saddle contour for Λ+ as
in Figure 1(c).
E. Game framework variation: power-based costs
With the cost Mq instead of Mγ, as α ↓ 0 (to purely altruistic behavior) the equilibrium point
converged to an opt-out equilibrium, i.e., (q0, q1) = (0, 0), consistent with Section IV-B.
VI. SUMMARY
We considered synchronously iterative two-player medium access games under simple ALOHA
or power-control dynamics. Assuming symmetric altruistic behavior (but not necessarily sym-
metric demand), we showed how the local asymptotic stability properties of the Nash equilibria
changed as a function of the degree of altruism. Even assuming the necessary information is free
of cost and perfect, such altruistic behavior may not have net beneficial effects in this regard.
4The coding strategy will, in many cases, additionally reduce the interference factor hi,3−i beyond propagation attenuation,
i.e., by a “processing gain” factor of the code, here assumed to be 13dB = 20 = hi,i/hi,3−i.
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In particular, partial altruistic behavior for an example ALOHA game can cause both interior,
feasible Nash equilibria to be stable. A beneficial stabilizing effect is possible for some cases
of a power control game when the NEP is unstable in the non-cooperative setting.
Acknowledgement: John F. Doherty for helpful discussions on power control.
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APPENDIX: FROM SINR TO QOS, γ
The following expressions for the bit error probability as a function of the modulation have
been derived [17]:
pe(SINR) =


1
2
erfc(
√
κ · SINR) for GMSK
1
2
exp (−SINR) for DBPSK
1
2
exp(−1
2
· SINR) for GFSK
1
2
erfc(
√
SINR) for QPSK
3
8
erfc(
√
2
5
· SINR) for 16-QAM
7
32
erfc(
√
4
21
· SINR) for 64-QAM
where κ is a constant (that depends on the amount of redundancy in the coding and on the
frequency band). In the absence of redundancy this gives the following expression for the prob-
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ability of correct reception of an n-bit packet assuming that the bit loss process is independent,
Γ(SINR) = (1− pe(SINR))n.
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